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ABSTRACT 
Social Attitudes and Economic Development: 
An Epidemiological Approach* 
In this paper we develop a new empirical approach to uncovering the impact 
of social attitudes on economic development. We first show that trust of 
second-generation Americans is significantly influenced by the country of 
origin of their forebears. In the spirit of the epidemiology literature, we interpret 
this phenomenon as the consequence of inherited social attitudes. We show 
that trust inherited by second-generation Americans from their country of 
origins has changed over time. This result allows us to use the inherited trust 
of second-generation Americans as a time-varying instrument to track back 
the evolution of trust in the home country of their parents. This strategy 
enables us to identify the specific impact of inherited trust on economic 
development relative to other traditional candidates, such as institutions and 
geography, by controlling for country fixed effects. We find that inherited trust 
has explained a substantial share of economic development on a sample of 
30 countries during the post-war period, by improving total factor productivity 
and the accumulation of human and physical capital. 
JEL Classification: F10, N13, O10 and P10 
Keywords: economic development, growth, social capital and trust 
Yann Algan 
CEPREMAP, PSE  
48 bv Jourdan,   
75014, Paris   
FRANCE   
Email: yann.algan@cepremap.cnrs.fr  
 
 
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=155652 
Pierre Cahuc 
CREST-INSEE  
Timbre J 360   
15, Boulevard Gabriel-Peri   
92245, Malakoff   
FRANCE   
Email: cahuc@univ-paris1.fr   
 
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=125314 
 
 
 
 
* We thank Philippe Aghion, Olivier Blanchard, Eve Caroli, Raquel Fernandez, 
Francis Kramarz, Guy Laroque, Thomas Philippon and Sebastien Roux for 
comments. We are especially grateful to Luigi Guiso who gave us very helpful 
comments on empirical strategy. We are also indebted to Christian Morrisson 
and Fabrice Murtin who provided historical data on education. We thank 
seminar audiences at CREST, SED, Marseille University and Paris School of 
Economics. 
 
Submitted 16 July 2007 
 
1 Introduction
What are the fundamental causes of large differences in income per capita across countries?
Although there is still little consensus on the answers to this question, a growing literature
considers social attitudes, such as trust, as one of the main determinants of current economic
development. As stressed by Arrow (1972, p. 357) “Virtually every commercial transaction
has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of
time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can
be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.” A prerequisite for the successful development of
market economies would be to depart from closed group interactions and to enlarge exchanges
to anonymous others. In this regard, trust and trustworthiness appear as the keystone for
successful economic development. This intellectual tradition dates back to Tocqueville (1835),
Weber (1902), and to a case study by Banfield (1958) showing that amoral familism, that
is lack of trust towards anyone not belonging to local groups, was associated with economic
backwardness in Italian villages.1 This view has recently been restated by economists by using
cross-country correlations between income per capita and indicators of social attitudes based on
individual social surveys (see La Porta et al., 1997, Knack and Keefer, 1997, Tabellini, 2005),
or by using micro studies on developing countries (Platteau, 2000).
These contributions attempt to uncover the impact of social attitudes on economic develop-
ment.2 However, we still lack reliable estimates which isolate the impact of social attitudes on
economic development independently of other factors already documented in the growth litera-
ture such as time-invariant institutions (Hall and Jones, 1999, Acemoglu et al., 2001, Rodrick,
1999, Djankov et al., 2002) or geography (Sachs, 2003). The main concern faced by studies
trying to uncover the impact of social attitudes is that they are based on cross-sectional com-
parisons without any time-variation.3 This makes it impossible to control for specific invariant
national features which could codetermine both social attitudes and economic development.4
This issue clearly shows up even in the most detailed contributions which rely on time
invariant instruments for social attitudes. For instance, in Tabellini’s (2005) paper it is shown
that variations in the literacy rate and the political institutions in place over the past several
centuries are correlated with variations in trust at the end of the twentieth century. Using
1See also Coleman (1988), Fukuyama (1995), Gambetta (1988), Greif (1993), Nisbett (1996), Putnam (1993,
2000).
2This empirical approach is complemented by theoretical papers which analyze the intergenerational trans-
mission of social attitudes. See Bisin and Verdier (2001), Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002), François and Zabojnik
(2005), Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Tabellini (2007).
3See Fernandez (2006) and Guiso et al. (2006) for recent surveys.
4See Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) for a survey on the empirical literature on trust and social capital.
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instrumental variable techniques, the correlation between the historical variables observed at
the end of the nineteenth century and the economic performance at the end of the twentieth
century can be interpreted as a causal impact of trust on economic development. But this
interpretation relies on two questionable assumptions. First, the literacy rate and the political
institutions in place over the past several centuries is required to have no direct impact on
economic performance at the end of the twentieth century. Second, all these variables must
not be determined by common factors. Although Tabellini provides a very careful analysis of
differences in performance of European regions including country fixed effects, the impossibility
to include region fixed effects implies that cross-region correlations between trust and economic
performance may come from unobserved region specific factors which codetermine trust and
economic performance. This limit is inherent in the empirical strategy: since trust is assumed to
be determined by historical variables which are fixed, it is not possible to account for variations in
trust and to use the potential correlations between trust and economic performance across time
by controlling for unobserved time invariant specific factors. It is thus still impossible to state
whether social attitudes do matter per se or if they pick up the more fundamental influence of
specific time invariant features such as the quality of institutions and the legal origins (Acemoglu
et al., 2001, Djankov et al.,2002, Hall and Jones, 1999), the extent of fractionalization (Rodrick,
1999, Alesina et al., 2001) or geography (Sachs, 2003). Other studies using hierarchical religions
(La Porta et al., 1997) or ethnic fractionalization (Knack and Keefer, 1997) as an instrument
for social attitudes encounter exactly the same limit.
A more convincing empirical strategy would thus require exploiting the information contained
in changes in trust across countries and over time. What we need is to find instruments for
national social attitudes which are time-varying. That would make it possible to ensure that
correlations between trust and economic performance are not determined by unobservable time
invariant country specific factors by including country fixed effects. The temporal dimension
of this problem is key since trust has been found to have dramatically changed over the past
decades. Its sharp decline in some countries is at the heart of a growing literature in sociology
and political science devoted to social attitudes.5 Surprisingly, this issue has been ignored so far
in the economic literature to explain the interplay between the dynamics of social capital and
economic growth.
In this paper, we propose a new method to identify changes in trust across countries and over
time. Our empirical strategy is based on the estimation of the inherited part of social attitudes
which is not instantaneously overdetermined by the economic and institutional features of the
country in which people are living. For that purpose, we show that social attitudes of second-
5 Inglehart and Welzel (2005), Putnam (2000).
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generation Americans are significantly influenced by the country of origin of their forebears.6
In the spirit of the epidemiology literature,7 we interpret this phenomenon as the consequence
of inherited social attitudes. Looking at inherited social attitudes has many appealing features.
First, the inherited part of social attitudes squares well with the notion of social capital, defined
as a stock of values inherited from the previous period. This paper thus provides a direct measure
of one dimension of the social capital stock, measured by inherited trust. Second, as long as
this stock is transmitted across generations, the inherited part of trust of second-generation
Americans should be closely correlated with trust in the home countries of people belonging
to the same cohorts. Our strategy should thus deliver a relevant instrument for trust in the
home countries. Last but not least, the level of inherited trust, as with any capital factor, is
predetermined for a given period, but could evolve over time, increasing in some periods and
depreciating in others. In that regard, since the parents of the second-generation Americans
migrated at different periods, they are likely to have transmitted different social attitudes to
their offspring. By looking at the inherited social attitudes of second-generation Americans
belonging to different cohorts, we thus can find changes over time in our instrument for social
attitudes, and isolate their specific impact on economic development relative to other time
invariant national features.
We evaluate potential changes in the inherited trust of second-generation Americans by
estimating the inherited trust of two separate cohorts of Americans: those who belonged to the
working age population between 1949-52 and those who belonged to the working age population
in 2000-2003. It turns out that inherited trust has changed over time: the influence of the
country of origin on the trust of people who were born in the United States depends on the
period of arrival of their forebears. It also appears that changes in the level of trust inherited
6See the excellent surveys of Fernandez and Fogli (2005) and Guiso et al. (2006) on the impact of culture
on economic behavior. The potential influence of the country of origin of the ancestors on US born people has
been analyzed by Reimers (1985), Blau (1992), Rice and Feldman (1997), Carroll et al. (1999), Antecol (2000),
Guinnane et al. (2002), Giuliano (2004), Fernandez and Fogli (2005) and Algan and Cahuc (2005). Blau (1992)
and Guinnane et al. (2002) examine whether the fertility of immigrants differs from that of the native born in the
US. Reimers (1985) and Antecol (2000) study the effect of the country of origin on the labor force participation
of immigrants. Rice and Feldman (1997) analyze trust and civic attitudes. Using the same approach, Giuliano
(2004) focuses on family leaving arrangements and Fernandez and Fogli (2005) analyze female labor participation
and fertility. Caroll et al. (1999) use this approach for the analysis of saving behavior, finding no significant
link between the country of origin and saving rates. Algan and Cahuc (2005) look at family values. Most of
these studies find a significant influence of the country of origin on attitudes, behavior and economic outcomes.
The persistence of inherited behavior is also documented for other countries. For instance, Guiso et al. (2004)
show that households are more likely to use checks, invest less in cash and more in stock, have higher access to
institutional credit, and make less use of informal credit in high-social-capital areas of Italy. They also show that
the behavior of movers is still affected by the level of social capital of the province where they were born. Alesina
and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2005) and Dohmen et al. (2006) evaluate the influence of attitudes inherited from parents
on current attitudes with different methodologies. They find a strong influence of parents on the attitudes of
children.
7We borrow this terminology from Raquel Fernandez (2006).
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from the country of origin of people born in the United States are in line with changes in the
level of trust in the corresponding home countries when we look at the same two cohorts who
were working in the 1950’s and the 2000’s. These findings suggest that the trust inherited from
the country of origin of people born in the US is potentially a good instrument for the trust of
people who live in the home countries. Obviously, the level of trust of people born in the United
States can be determined by country specific factors that also influence economic performance
and trust in their country of origin. For instance, it might be the case that Americans whose
ancestors came from highly developed countries inherited a high level of trust, and that the past
high level of development also has a positive influence on future trust and economic performance
in the country of origin. The value-added of our empirical strategy is precisely to enable us to
control for such factors by the inclusion of country fixed effects and indicators on the past level
of economic development in the home country at the time when the parents’ immigration took
place.
This strategy allows us to show that there is a significant impact of trust on income per
capita for 30 countries over the period 1949-2003. The set of countries covers all the regions of
the world, with European countries, North American countries, Asian countries and the African
and Latin American continents. We find that developing countries such as African countries,
taken as a whole, would have been able to double their output per capita between the 1950’s
and the 2000’s if they had had the same level of inherited trust as that of the Swedish people.
The impact is also economically sizeable since a country like Germany would have an income per
capita 15 percent higher in the 2000’s if the level of inherited trust of German people had been
identical to that of the Swedish people. Eventually, we show that the main channels through
which inherited trust affects income per capita is total factor productivity and incentives to
accumulate physical and human capital. And the magnitude of such aggregate effects of trust
is linked to strong positive social interaction effects between individuals prone to cooperation.
The paper is organized as follows. The estimation strategy is presented in section 2. Data are
described in section 3. The results are presented in section 4. Section 5 presents our conclusions.
2 Estimation strategy
What is the impact of social attitudes on macroeconomic performance? To answer this question,
one has to deal with the issue of endogeneity at stake in the estimation of the following equation
Yct = α0 + α1Sct + α2Xct + Fc + Ft + εct (1)
where Yct stands for indicators of macroeconomic performance (including, in alternative speci-
fications, income per capita and its different components: capital stock per capita, employment
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rate, human capital and total factor productivity) in country c at period t. The variable Sct
measures the country average of social attitudes of working age individuals, conditional on their
individual characteristics such as age, number of years of education, employment status and
religious affiliation; Xct denotes a vector of average characteristics of the population and past
economic development of the economy; Fc stands for country fixed effects capturing all other
time invariant specific features such as legal origins or past institutions with long-lasting effects;
Ft stands for period fixed effects common to all countries; εct denotes an error term. The in-
clusion of country fixed effects ensures that the correlation between economic performance and
attitudes is not driven by unobservable country time invariant specific factors.
The problem with equation (1) is that contemporaneous social attitudes are likely to be
correlated with the unobserved error term εct. For instance, individuals who live in a more
secure environment are likely to trust others more and to be more efficient. To tackle this
issue, we need to explain how social attitudes are determined. Recent studies by Bisin and
Verdier (2001), Bisin, Topa and Verdier (2004), Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Tabellini (2007)
stress the role of two main forces. A part of social attitudes is shaped by the contemporaneous
environment and another part is shaped by inherited attitudes from earlier generations. This
suggests positing the following model
Sct = γ0 + γ1Sct−1 + γ2Xct +Φc +Φt + νct (2)
where Φc and Φt stand for country and time dummies respectively; Sc,t−1 denotes the average
attitudes of the previous generation and νct is an error term.
In equation (2), it is assumed that current social attitudes of individuals of working age are
determined by all factors likely to influence economic performance and by the social attitudes of
the previous generation. This assumption has key implications for the definition of the different
periods t on which our econometric analysis should focus. In particular, we have to look at
periods which are separated by sufficiently large gaps to account for changes in average social
attitudes across generations that do not overlap. The analysis is focused on two periods and
then two cohorts: Americans who were born in the US between 1884 and 1934 and between
1935 and 1985. The analysis of these groups leads us to focus on people who belonged to the
working age population (between 18 and 65 years old) in two periods: 1949-1952 and 2000-2003
respectively, without any overlap between the two cohorts. 8
The restriction that social attitudes of the working age individuals of the past generation are
8Since we use the World Value Survey which provides information only on people who are more than eighteen
years old, we consider that the working age population is made up of people aged from eighteen to sixty five years
old. Accordingly, people who were working between 2000-2003 were born between 1935 and 1985, and people who
were working in 1949-1952 were born during the period 1884-1934.
5
excluded from the economic performance equation (1) allows us to identify, together with the
assumption that εct ⊥ Sct−1, the parameters of the system of equations (1) and (2). This restric-
tion can be consistent to the extent that the variables which account for current characteristics
of the economy are included in the right-hand side of the economic performance equation (1)
and that the forty-eight years gap between the two dates t is large enough. However, as stressed
by Tabellini (2005), the problem of this specification is that we do not have any information on
Sct−1, since standardized cross-country databases on social attitudes of earlier generations are
not available.
To cope with the lack of information on social attitudes of the previous generation, we pro-
pose the following alternative strategy. We replace the variable Sct−1 by the average (conditional
on individual characteristics) social attitudes that second-generation Americans inherited from
country c. At first glance, this strategy makes sense to the extent that if social attitudes in-
herited from country c in the US are correlated with contemporaneous social attitudes in the
corresponding home country c, it is because people whose forebears originate from the same
country share common past social attitudes. Therefore, it seems relevant to assume that the
correlation between average social attitudes of people whose forebears were born in country c
and average social attitudes of people currently living in country c reflects the causal impact of
such common past social attitudes, independently of εct, the current shocks on macroeconomic
performance in country c.
This estimation strategy relies on two assumptions that are worth describing more precisely.
1. First, it is assumed that S˜ct, the conditional average of trust of the working-age people in
period t, who live and were born in the US and whose parents immigrated from country c,
follows a transmission process across generations similar to that of equation (2), that is:
S˜ct = γ˜0 + γ˜1Sct−1 + Φ˜t + ν˜ct, (3)
where ν˜ct denotes an error term. Let us denote by t = 1 and t = 2 the period 1949-1952
and 2000-2003 respectively. It is shown, in appendix A, that this assumption about the
transmission of trust allows us to estimate an equation similar to equation (2) in the period
2000-2003, where we replace, on the right hand side, the conditional average of trust of
people of working age living in country c in the period 1949-1952, Sc1, by the conditional
average of trust that second-generation Americans of working age inherited from country
c in the period 2000-2003, denoted by S˜c2. Note that we could use the same substitution
in equation (2) for the period 1949-1952. We would replace Sc0, the conditional average
of trust of the generation which was of working age in 1898-1901, which appears in the
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right hand side of equation (2) written in the period 1949-1952, by S˜c1, the inherited trust
of Americans during the period 1949-1952. Yet, if this approach is useful to estimate the
model in the period 2000-2003, it is not possible at this stage to estimate the model in all
periods since there are no available data on the social attitudes of working-age people in
the period 1949-1952.
2. In order to uncover the level of trust of working-age people in the period 1949-1952, we
rely on potential cohort effects in social attitudes. Empirical studies using the General
Social Survey have shown that American born at different times exhibit different levels of
trust, controlling for age and period (Putnam, 2000, Robinson and Jackson, 2001). This
means that trust is influenced by cohort effects. Denoting by S0c2 the average of trust of
“old” people (who are no longer in the working age population in period 2000-2003, i.e.
who were born between 1884 and 1935) who live in country c in period t = 2, we assume
that
S0c2 = pi0 + Sc1 + ξc2, (4)
where ξc2 is an error term. Importantly, we do not impose that social attitudes should re-
main constant within a cohort. In that regard, we do not instrument trust of the previous
generation Sc1 by the trust of the current old generation S0c2. It would not be a valid
instrument since social attitudes within a generation can change due to specific country
shocks ξc2 which also affect current economic performance, that is corr(ξct, εct) = 0. There-
fore, we use the same approach as in assumption 1. We assume that S˜0c2, the conditional
average of trust of “old” people who were born in the US and originate from country c, is
determined by the model:
S˜0c2 = p˜i0 + S˜c1 + ξ˜c2,
where ξ˜c2 is an error term which is likely to be independent of the error term εct that
appears in the economic performance equation (1). It is shown in appendix A that this
assumption allows us to estimate an equation similar to equation (2) in the period 1949-
1952 where S˜c1 (that was used as a substitute for Sc0), the conditional average of social
attitudes of working-age people living in the US in the period 1949-1952, is replaced by
the conditional average of social attitudes of “old” people living in the US in the period
2000-2003.
In what follows we apply our estimation strategy to evaluate the causal impact of trust on
economic performance. Before presenting the results, let us first look at the data.
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3 Data description
In this section, we discuss the data used to measure social attitudes and to identify inherited
social attitudes from the country of origin of people born in the United States. We also look at
historical data on economic development for time periods and countries that match the data on
social attitudes. Our analysis covers the period 1949-2003. The sample consists of 30 countries:
Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands,
Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Spain, Senegal, Sweden, United
Kingdom and Zimbabwe.
3.1 Social attitudes and inherited social attitudes
Social attitudes of individuals born in the United States are provided by the General Social
Survey database (GSS). This database covers the period 1972-2004 and provides information
on the birth place and the country of origin of the respondent’s forebears since 1977. The GSS
variable for the country of origin reads as follows: “From what countries or part of the world did
your ancestors come?” Origins cover almost all European countries: Austria, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The GSS database also
reports Latin American countries: Mexico, Puerto Rico, and a broad category labelled “Latin
American countries with Spanish origins”. Information on Asian origin is available for: China,
India and the Philippines. Additionally, the GSS also reports two broad categories for Arabic
origins or African origins.
To measure cultural transmission of social attitudes across generations, we use information
on the waves of immigration. Respondents are asked if they are born in the United States
and how many of their parents and grand-parents were born in the country. The question
on parents birthplace is scaled 0 if both parents are born in the US, 1 if only the mother is
born in the US, and 2 if only the respondent’s father is born in the country. The answer on
grand-parents birthplace is scaled from 0 to 4 indicating the number of grandparents born in
the US. This information makes it possible to disentangle four potential waves of immigrations:
fourth-generation Americans (all grand-parents born in the US), third-generation Americans (all
grand-parents immigrated to the US and all parents were born in the US), second-generation
Americans (all parents immigrated to the United States) and first-generation Americans. This
database offers the possibility of tracking back the cultural transmission of social attitudes by
disentangling the different waves of immigration.
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Social attitudes in the home countries are measured by the World Value Survey (WVS)
database. The WVS covers three main waves (1980, 1990, 2000) for the same set of countries
defined as potential country of origin in the GSS database. We reconstruct the categories
African and Latin American origin by clustering corresponding countries in the WVS database.
For African countries, we use information on the West Coast with Senegal since the slave trade
mainly took place in this part of the continent. We also include the two additional available
African countries, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, for more recent waves of immigrations. The two
available Arabic countries are Algeria and Morocco. And regarding Latin American countries
with Spanish origins, we select the available corresponding countries including Argentina and
Colombia.
Finally, social attitudes are measured by the level of interpersonal trust. We use the following
question provided by the WVS and GSS databases: “Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”. The
answers are given on a scale from 1 to 3, which corresponds to “Most people can be trusted”,
“Can’t be too careful”, “Depends”. We construct a trust indicator equal to one if the respondent
answers that people can be trusted and 0 if she answers that one should be careful (after deleting
the answers “do not know”). The choice of this question about mutual trust is motivated by two
reasons. First, the cross country correlation between trust, as measured by this question, and
economic performance has been widely documented. This allows us to reassess the economic
role of trust when a causal relation is identified. Second, this is the only question on social
attitudes for which we have a sufficiently large number of observations in the GSS database to
implement our empirical strategy.
In Appendix - Table 12, we report the summary statistics for second-generation Americans.
The sample provides at least 30 observations per country of origin. The most representative
groups came from Italy (471 observations), Germany (331 observations), United Kingdom (268
observations) or Latin America (360 observations from Mexico, 211 observations from Puerto
Rico and 196 observations from other Spanish Latin American origins). The level of trust is
on average 39.87 percent with a standard deviation of 48.8 percent. Trust varies dramatically
by country of origin: from only 18.2 percent and 19.9 percent among people with Puerto-Rican
origins or African origins, to 56.4 percent and 78.8 percent among second-generation Amer-
icans with Swedish or Danish origins. The respondents in our sample of second-generation
Americans are on average 51.3 years old, 43 percent are men, with on average 12.3 years of
education and 52 percent are employed, 45 percent are inactive and 3 percent are unemployed.
Note that second-generation Americans with European origins are much older than their coun-
terparts coming from developing countries. In Appendix - Table 13, we report the summary
9
statistics for the corresponding home countries which are taken from the WVS database for
the waves 1980, 1990, 2000. The sample of countries of residency is made up of at least 1000
observations for each country and the demographic characteristics are quite similar to that of
second-generation Americans. The average level of trust in the home countries is 31.8 percent,
which is approximately 7 percentage points lower than that of second-generation Americans. Yet
the cross-country variation is similar to that found among second-generation Americans coming
from different countries of origin, the standard deviation reaching 46.5 percent.
3.2 GDP, Physical Capital, Human Capital, Employment and TFP
Economic performance is measured by income per capita expressed in 1990 US dollars. Data
borrowed from Maddison cover the period 1820-2003. We consider two periods: 1949-1952 and
2000-2003. These periods are chosen so that people who belonged to the working age population
in each period are born at dates that do not overlap. We also assess the main channels through
which social attitudes are likely to affect economic development, including physical capital,
human capital, employment and total factor productivity. Human capital is measured by the
average number of years of education provided by Morrisson and Murtin (2005). Data on the
physical capital stock are constructed as follows. We draw on the Easterly and Levine database
(2001) which provides capital stock figures from 1951 to 1990.9 The database is completed by
using data on the investment share of GDP, provided by the Penn World Tables, to calculate
total investment. Then, we calculate TFP as a standard Solow residual by assuming an identical
share of capital and labor across countries. All variables are defined in 1990 US dollars. Data are
averaged over the periods 1949-1952 and 2000-2003. The average macroeconomic performances
of the countries of our sample are reported in Appendix - Table 14.
4 Results
We first document the influence of the country of origin on trust of second-generation Americans.
Second, we show that inherited trust of second-generation Americans is correlated with trust
in the home countries. Then, we estimate the impact of trust on economic development by
using the inherited trust of second-generation Americans as an instrument for trust in their
home country. We run over-identification tests to check the validity of this instrument. We also
decompose the channels through which trust is likely to influence macroeconomic performance
by distinguishing its impact on physical capital, human capital, labor force and total factor
productivity. Finally, we provide evidence that the strong macroeconomic impact of inherited
9The capital stock is computed from investment flows with the depreciation rate provided by Easterly and
Levine (1999). The initial capital stock in 1951 is also borrowed from Easterly and Levine.
10
trust on economic development depends on social interactions: trust fosters cooperation only to
the extent that trusting individuals interact with people who share the same high level of trust
and are prone to cooperate with each other.
4.1 Inherited social attitudes in the US
Measure of inherited social attitudes
In order to measure how second-generation Americans varied in their social attitudes depend-
ing on their country-of-ancestry, we run an individual level probit regression on the answers to
the trust question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that
you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”. The dependent variable is equal to one
if the respondent thought that most people can be trusted and zero otherwise. In addition
to country-of-ancestry dummies, we also control for age (age squared), sex, education, income,
employment status and religious affiliation. We also use information on the level of education
of the parents of the respondents. This information might be crucial since potential correlation
between social attitudes and ethnic heritage might transit through parents’ characteristics such
as human capital rather than culture per se. All estimations include year dummies to control for
specific temporal shocks. All standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level.
Americans with Swedish ancestors are taken as the reference group.
Table 1 reports the marginal effects of the country-of-ancestry dummies for Americans who
were born in the United States between 1935 and 1985. Marginal effects are computed with
the remaining variables evaluated at their means. In this first step, we select all Americans
belonging to this cohort, whatever the wave of immigration of their forebears. Since most
individual characteristics are likely to be endogenous as regards the level of trust, Table 1-
Col.1 first reports the results when only demographic variables (age and gender) are taken into
account. Column 1 shows that the fact of having forebears coming from a different country of
origin than Sweden always has a statistically significant effect at the 1 percent level on social
attitudes. The gap is the most sizeable for Americans with African origins, Latin American
origins and Indian origins, the probability of trusting others being reduced by 33 percent, 29
percent and 25 percent by comparison with Americans with Swedish forebears. Respondents
with Mediterranean origins and Eastern European origins come next. For instance, the fact
of having Italian origins reduces by 12 percent the level of trust in comparison to people with
Swedish origins. Respondents with Continental European origins also tend to be less trusting
than Americans with Swedish forebears, but the gap is less sizeable. German or Austrian origins
would reduce by 7.2 percent and 6.6 percent respectively social attitudes. The fact of having
forebears from the UK also leads to a lower level of trust but the gap with Sweden amounts to
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only 1.8 percent. Finally, people whose forebears came from other Nordic countries tend to have
comparable or slightly higher levels of trust.
Table 1-Col.2 reports the marginal estimates of inherited attitudes when the full set of
other individual controls is taken into account. Strikingly, the coefficients associated with the
country of origin are still highly significant and remain fairly unchanged. Table 2 reports the
corresponding marginal effects associated with individual controls. As expected, the level of trust
increases with the level of education, the level of education of parents (but only transmitted by
the mother), the level of income, age, and the fact of being employed rather than unemployed.
But apart from education, no other individual controls are statistically significant. In particular,
no significant statistical relation with individual trust shows up. This finding raises concern
about the possibility of explaining and instrumenting social attitudes by religious affiliation in
aggregate panel data.
Changes in inherited social attitudes
Table 3 reports the marginal effects of country of origin dummies for second-generation
Americans. We distinguish the two cohorts of Americans who were born between 1885-1934 and
1935-1985. Only controls for demographic variables are included at this first stage. To make the
comparison between cohorts meaningful, we drop countries of origin for which we have less than
15 observations. For both cohorts, the country-of-ancestry dummies are highly significant and
economically sizeable. Coefficients vary from -37 percent (Philippine origins) to 39.8 percent
(Danish origins) for second-generation Americans born between 1884 and 1934 and they vary
from -26 percent (African origins) to 2.1 (Dutch origins) for second-generation Americans born
between 1935 and 1985. It is instructive to notice that inherited trust for respondents whose
parents came from France, Germany or the United Kingdom was higher than that of people
with Swedish origins as far as the older cohort (born between 1884 and 1934) is concerned. By
contrast, inherited trust seems to have deteriorated compared to people with Swedish origins
regarding the younger cohort of people born between 1935 and 1985.
We do not investigate how the history of each country could explain changes in social at-
titudes. Such an investigation would require knowing exactly when the respondent’s ancestors
came to the United States to identify whether or not the ancestors witnessed major national
crisis. The GSS database does not provide such information. Yet, the parents of the two cohorts
are likely to have undergone very different national crises. The majority of respondents who
belong to the cohort born between 1884-1934 is likely to be made up of individuals whose par-
ents did not undergo the two World Wars, contrary to the individuals born between 1935-1985.
The social attitudes of immigrants from countries deeply involved in these wars, such as France
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or Germany, have thus deteriorated between these two cohorts compared to descendants from
Sweden, since this latter country is one of the few European countries which was not affected
by the two wars. This finding would be consistent with those obtained by Alesina and Ferrara
(2002) who show that a history of traumatic experience is associated with low trust.
4.2 Inherited social attitudes in the home countries
This section examines the correlations between inherited social attitudes of second-generation
Americans and social attitudes in the home country of their parents. This analysis is a key step
in our empirical approach, since a significant correlation between the two variables is required
to use the social attitudes of second-generation Americans as an instrument for social attitudes
in the home country of their parents. We proceed in two steps. First we analyze the correlation
between inherited trust of second-generation Americans in the United States and trust in the
corresponding home countries. Then, we check that the social attitudes of first-generation
immigrants are in line with those of their country of origin to make sure that the observed
correlation between the inherited trust of second-generation Americans in the United States
and trust in the corresponding home countries is not an artifact.
4.2.1 Inherited trust and trust in the home country
We start by looking at the cross-section correlation between inherited trust in the United States
and in the home countries. Figure 1 illustrates the basic correlation between the marginal effect
of the country of residency and the marginal effect of the country of origin on the level of trust.
The correlation is displayed for the cohort born between 1935 and 1985 (the same correlation
pattern holds for the other cohort). The marginal effect of the country of residency on social
attitudes is derived from probit estimates on the WVS database in the wave 2000. We control for
the same demographic individual characteristics as those used in the estimation of the marginal
effect of the country-of-ancestry in the GSS database. As it happens, there is a positive relation
between inherited trust of second-generation Americans and that of the same cohort living in
the home country, the R-squared reaching 0.51. Figure 1 suggests that parents who migrated to
the United States have transplanted their level of trust to their children in much of the same way
as parents who stayed instead in the home country did. More rigorous analysis below confirms
this phenomenon.
Table 4-Col.1 & 2 reports GLS regressions of the cross-section correlation between the level
of trust of second-generation Americans and that of people currently living in their country of
origin. We run these estimations on the two cohorts of people born between 1884-1934 and
1935-1985 taken together. The dependent variable is the level of trust in the country of origin
13
Table 1: Marginal effect associated with the country of origin of Americans: Probit estimates
Trust in others=1
Americans born between 1935-85
country of origin (1) : No controls (2): Controls
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
Africa -.337*** (.000) -.302*** (.002)
Arab -.113*** (.001) -.042*** (.005)
Austria -.066*** (.001) -.031*** (.006)
Belgium -.046*** (.002) .045*** (.002)
Canada -.109*** (.000) -.086*** (.001)
China -173*** (.008) -.169 (.012)
Czech Republic -.109*** (.000) -.103*** (.006)
Denmark -.036*** (.000) -.041*** (.000)
Finland .057*** (.001) .065*** (.001)
France -.077*** (.000) -.050*** (.001)
Germany -.072*** (.000) -060*** (.000)
Greece -.091*** (.001) -.092*** (.002)
Hungary -.085*** (.000) -.097*** (.001)
India -.252*** (.001) -.251*** (.002)
Ireland -.068*** (.000) -.050*** (.001)
Italy -.129*** (.000) -.118*** (.003)
Japan -.064*** (.002) -.077*** (.002)
Latin America other -.295*** (.001) -.280*** (.001)
Mexico -.174*** (.001) -.116*** (.002)
Netherlands -.109*** (.000) -.083*** (.002)
Norway .053*** (.000) .064*** (.000)
Philippines -.129*** (.002) -.136*** (.003)
Poland -.078*** (.000) -.081*** (.000)
Portugal -.093*** (.000) -.096*** (.002)
Puerto Rico -.349*** (.000) -.327*** (.001)
Spain -.071*** (.000) -.054*** (.001)
Sweden Reference
Switzerland -.021*** (.001) .033*** (.001)
United Kingdom -.026*** (.000) -.037*** (.001)
Individual controls Age, Age2, Sex Full specification
Pseudo-R2 .051 .085
Observations 9651 9507
Marginal effects with robust standard error.
General Social Survey: ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10%
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Table 2: Marginal effect associated with individual characteristics
Trust in others=1 Cohorts 1935-85
Controls Coeff Std Error
Age .009*** (.003)
Age2 -.000 (.000)
Men .020* (.010)
Education .042*** (.002)
Education mother .013*** (.011)
Education father -.000 (.001)
Income category .033 (.029)
Unemployed Reference
Employed .057 (.037)
Inactive .043 (.031)
Protestant Reference
Catholic .001 (.019)
Muslim .042 (.275)
Jew -.015 (.048)
Buddhist .026 (.075)
No religion -.004 (.010)
Marginal effects with robust standard error.
GSS : ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10
measured by the marginal effect of each country with Sweden as the country of reference. The
explanatory variable is the marginal effect of the country of origin on the level of trust of second-
generation Americans, where second-generation Americans with Swedish origins constitute the
reference group. The coefficients are those displayed in Table 3. Table 4 - Col. 1 first shows the
correlation without any controls. Table 4 - Col. 2 includes the initial average gap in the level of
GDP per capita in the home country relative to Sweden at the time the forebears immigrated.
Controlling for initial GDP is key in as much as this variable could co-determine both inherited
attitudes transmitted by the previous generation to their offsprings in the United States and the
current gap in GDP in the corresponding home countries relatively to Sweden. Thus, including
this variable should dampen our concern that inherited attitudes could affect the current GDP
gap by other channels than trust. In the first specification, the coefficient of correlation is fairly
high, reaching .859, and significant at the 1 percent level. The magnitude of the correlation
is lowered by more than half when the lagged value of the gap in GDP per capita relative to
Sweden is included. But the coefficient is still statistically significant at the one percent level.
We then assess to what extent the within evolution of trust among the two cohorts of
Americans who belong to the working age group in 1949-1952 and 2000-2003 is correlated with
the evolution of trust among the same two cohorts who were living in the corresponding home
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Table 3: Marginal effect associated with the country of origin for the cohorts 1884-1934 and
1935-1985.
Trust in others=1
country of origin
Second-generation Americans
Born between 1884-1934
(1)
Second-generation Americans
Born between 1935-1985
(2)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
Africa -.258*** (.015) -.260*** (.006)
Arab -.061*** (.013)
Austria .068*** (.011) -.205*** (.006)
Canada -.015 (.019) -.134*** (.003)
China -.063*** (.028) -.125*** (.008)
Czech Republic .034 (.010) -.237*** (.010)
Denmark .398*** (.007) -.031** (.018)
Finland .022*** (.011)
France .169*** (.015) -.090*** (.006)
Germany .002 (.012) -.179*** (.006)
Greece -.285*** (.015) -.052*** (.005)
Hungary .050*** (.011) -.184*** (.006)
India -.056*** (.024) -.138*** (.008)
Ireland .063*** (.003) -.026*** (.005)
Italy -.118*** (.012) -.129*** (.003)
Latin America other -.345*** (.012) -.246*** (.008)
Mexico -.313*** (.019) -.237*** (.009)
Netherlands .020*** (.003) .021* (.011)
Norway .161*** (.001) -.040*** (.009)
Poland .007 (.012) -.110*** (.001)
Philippines -.373*** (.005) -.193*** (.005)
Portugal .092*** (.027) -.214*** (.002)
Puerto Rico -.191*** (.027) -.279*** (.008)
Spain -.307*** (.017) -.097*** (.008)
Sweden Reference
United Kingdom .010 (.010) -.087*** (.004)
Pseudo-R2 .051 .061
Observations 845 956
Marginal effects with robust standard error. General Social Survey: ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10%
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countries. If parents do transfer their social attitudes to their offsprings in a similar way,
regardless of whether they still live in the home country or have immigrated to the United
States, a significant positive correlation in variations in social attitudes across the two cohorts
should show up in the home country and in the United States.
Table 4 - Col. 3 and Col. 4 document this within correlation by controlling for country
fixed effects. It is worth stressing that country fixed effects also enable us to capture all time
invariant country features which could influence inherited trust for second generation Americans
and people currently living in the home countries of their parents. The dependent variable of the
regression is still the level of trust of people living in the home country of the parents captured
by marginal effects of the country of residency relative to Sweden. The explanatory variable is
the level of trust of second-generation Americans measured by the marginal effect of countries
of ancestry relative to Swedish origins. Table 4 - Col. 3 reports the within correlation without
controlling for the gap in lagged GDP per capita while Table 4 - Col. 4 includes it. In both
cases, the within correlation is positive and highly significant at the one percent level, suggesting
that inherited trust of second-generation Americans is a relevant instrument for explaining the
level of trust in the home countries.
It is worth stressing that the coefficient associated with inherited trust is dramatically re-
duced by the inclusion of lagged GDP. This result suggests that past economic performance has
a significant influence on current trust in addition to time-invariant national features. This point
illustrates that high levels of past education or of past income favor the development of cooper-
ative attitudes. Moreover, we also find that country fixed effects have a statistically significant
and economically sizeable impact on current trust. This last point highlights the value-added
of our approach which uses a time-varying instrument for trust and thus makes it possible to
account for other fundamental determinants of social attitudes captured by fixed effects.
Table 4: Estimated effect of inherited attitudes on current national social attitudes. GLS
Estimations.
Dependent variable Trust of nationals in country of residency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust of second-generation Americans by
country-of-ancestry
.859***
(.000)
.310**
(.157)
.381***
(.000)
.207***
(0.002)
Lagged gap of GDP per capita No Yes*** No Yes***
Country dummies No No Yes*** Yes***
Observations 47 45 47 45
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Figure 1: Trust of second-generation Americans by country of origin relative to trust of nationals
in country of residency. Note: Marginal effect from probit estimates onWVS and GSS databases.
4.2.2 Social attitudes of immigrants and sample selection
A potential issue raised by our strategy is that our sample of immigrants might not be repre-
sentative of the home countries’ populations. Their social attitudes and other socio-economic
characteristics may differ significantly from those of their country of origin at the time of their
arrival in the US. The most direct test to check the representativeness of the migrants consists in
focusing on first-generation Americans, that is immigrants who were born in their home country
and migrated to the United States. We then compare their individual level of trust and their
characteristics with those of their counterparts who are living in the corresponding home coun-
try. The comparison is run on the working age population over the period 1977-2002 for the
GSS database, providing data for the United States, and the waves 1980, 1990 and 2000 for the
WVS database which provides information for the home countries.
Figure 2 reports the correlation between trust of immigrants and that of people remaining in
home countries, controlling for individual characteristics including age, age squared, education,
income category, policy orientation and employment status. Countries of origin with less than
15 observations in the GSS database have been dropped to ease the comparison. As it happens,
the correlation is fairly high, leading to a R2 =62.5 percent. These results show that the social
attitudes of first generation immigrants are indeed strongly correlated with those of people living
in their country of origin. This correlation is consistent with the impact of the country of origin
on the social attitudes of the second-generation American found above.
18
Table 5: Transmission of trust across generations
Trust in others=1
Country
of origin
Fourth-generation
(1)
Third-generation
(2)
Second-generation
(3)
First-generation
(4)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Coeff
Africa -.257*** (.001) -.235*** (.020) -.273*** (.012) -.280*** (.005)
Arab .039* (.023) -.051* (.025) -.184*** (.014)
Austria .085*** (.011) .065*** (.006) .047*** (.004) -.107*** (.009)
Canada .009 (.002) .032* (.017) .025** (.012) -.185*** (.007)
China -.317*** (.027) -.119*** (.023) -.203*** (.012)
Czech Rep. -.077*** (.000) -.205*** (.008) .033* (.005) -.074** (.027)
Denmark .021*** (.001) .132** (.013) .402* (.004) -.219*** (.017)
Finland -.013*** (.002) -.122*** (.016) .092* (.011)
France .023*** (.001) -.104*** (.009) -.035** (.015) -.184*** (.014)
Germany .027 (.001) -.010* (.005) -.085*** (.005) -.134*** (.013)
Greece -.337*** (.005) -.168*** (.012) -.115*** (.010)
Hungary .033*** (.002) -.124*** (.013) -.018*** (.006) -.044*** (.015)
India -.162*** (.021) -.223*** (.012)
Ireland .008*** (.001) -.017*** (.003) .051*** (.006) -.101*** (.014)
Italy -.023*** (.001) -.197*** (.013) -.083*** (.006) -.202*** (.012)
Latin Am -.260*** (.002) -.260*** (.014) -.295*** (.007)
Mexico -.031*** (.002) -.178*** (.020) -.181*** -.255*** (.013)
Netherlands -.046*** (.002) -.115*** (.013) .081*** (.009) .034 (.026)
Norway .126*** (.001) .128*** (.012) .140*** (.003) .089*** (.022)
Poland .019 (.000) -.053*** (.014) -.050*** (.004) -.158*** (.012)
Philippines -.229*** (.014) -.282*** (.006)
Portugal .236*** (.005) .048** (.022) -.131*** (.013) -.132*** (.017)
Puerto Rico -.272*** (.001) -.305*** (.028) -.235*** (.017) -.243*** (.014)
Spain -.048*** (.001) -.097*** (.017) -.189*** (.009)
Sweden Reference
U.K .043 (.002) -.054*** (.009) -.016** (.008) -.123*** (.019)
Pseudo-R2 .0961 .085 .0865 .087
Observations 7176 855 1924 1580
Marginal effects with robust standard error. GSS: ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10%
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Source: GSS 1977-2002, WVS 1980-200.
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4.3 The impact of inherited social attitudes on macroeconomic performance
4.3.1 GDP per capita
This section documents the impact of social attitudes on economic development by estimating
the system of equations (1) and (2) written as follows:10
∆Yct = α1∆Sct + α2∆Xct + Fc +∆εct, (5)
∆Sct = δ1∆S˜ct + δ2∆Xct +Φc +∆νct, (6)
where the operator ∆ stands for the differences between the value of the variable and its value
in Sweden. In the benchmark estimation, Yt denotes GDP per capita measured in 1990 dollars
for the period t = 1 (1949-1952) and t = 2 (2000-2003). The variable Sct measures the country
average of social attitudes of the working age individuals who were born between 1884-1934 (for
t = 1) and 1935-1985 (for t = 2), conditional on their individual characteristics; Xct denotes
lagged GDP per capita; Fc and Φc stand for country fixed effects. Inherited social attitudes of
second-generation Americans are denoted by S˜ct.
Main results
Since social attitudes in the home countries are likely to be biased by reverse causality, we
instrument social attitudes in the home countries by inherited attitudes S˜ct of second-generation
Americans belonging to the same two cohorts in equation (6). In line with our previous esti-
mation strategy, social attitudes in home countries ∆Sct are measured by the marginal effects
of the country of residency on trust relative to Sweden. Similarly, social attitudes of second-
generation Americans, ∆S˜ct, are measured by the marginal effect of their country of origin on
trust relative to second-generation Americans whose parents immigrated from Sweden. The co-
efficients correspond to those displayed in Figure 1. ∆Xct is the lagged gap in GDP per capita
relative to Sweden (namely the GDP gap in 1900-1903 for the period 1949-1952 and the GDP
gap in 1949-1952 for the period 2000-2003). Moreover we also control for country fixed effects
in equations (5) and (6).
Three stage Least Square (3SLS) estimates of the system of equations (1) and (2) are reported
in Table 6. Panel A reports the second stage estimation of the coefficient α1, panel B gives
the corresponding first stage regression for the coefficient δ1, and panel C reports basic GLS
regressions of current GDP and social attitudes in the home countries. Table 6-Col. 1 reports
the correlation between trust and the gap in GDP per capita relative to Sweden without any
10The exact form of the system of equations that is estimated is presented in equations (A9)-(A12) in appendix
A.
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additional controls for both the first stage and the second stage regressions. Column 2 includes
the lagged value of the gap in GDP per capita in both regressions. Column 3 includes country
dummies and assesses the within effect of changes in trust on variation in the gap of GDP per
capita relatively to Sweden. In all specifications, the instrument for trust in the home countries
is significant at the 1 percent level and the implied IV estimated effect of trust on GDP per
capita is also significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 6: IV Regressions of GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Dependent variable: GDP per capita (3SLS)
Trust in home countries 25843
***
(3086)
38579***
(7114)
30238***
( 9261)
Lagged gap in GDP per capita Yes*** Yes***
Country dummies No No Yes***
Adj-R2 .563 0.856 0.888
Panel B : Dependent variable: Trust in home countries (3SLS)
Trust of second-generation Americans
by country-of-ancestry
.865***
(.145)
.3864***
(.076)
.208***
(.067)
Lagged gap in GDP per capita Yes*** Yes***
Country dummies No No Yes***
Adj-R2 .421 0.956 0.973
Panel C : Dependent variable: GDP per capita (GLS)
Trust in home countries 22328
***
(2785)
5757*
(3113)
23561***
(8168)
Lagged gap in GDP per capita Yes*** Yes*
Country dummies No No Yes***
Observations 45 43 43
These results show that IV estimated effects of trust on GDP are sizeable. To illustrate the
quantitative impact of social attitudes on GDP per capita, Figure 3 displays the change in GDP
per capita in period 2000-2003 that countries would have experienced if the level of inherited
trust in a given country had been the same as that prevailing in Sweden during that period.11
This Figure shows that GDP per capita in 2000 would have been increased by more than 100
percent in Africa and India if the level of inherited trust among the working age population had
been the same as in Sweden by that time, controlling for initial level of GDP per capita in 1950
and for time invariant country fixed effects. Africa and poor countries such as India and China
11The change in GDP per capita is equal to −α1δ1SˆUSct where the estimated value of the coefficients α1 and δ1
are taken from Table 6-Col 3, Panels A and B.
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Figure 3: Predicted variations in GDP per capita in period 2000-2003 if the level of inherited
trust of people in working age were the same as in Sweden, controlling for country fixed effects.
are obviously extreme cases. It is well documented that these developing countries are plagued
by an important lack of interpersonal trust. As Banfield (1958), Fafchamps (1996) or Platteau
(2000) have argued, traditional societies are characterized by pervasive intra-group trust and
do not extent this trust to anonymous interactions. The functioning of markets is drastically
limited when trust is circumscribed to small groups. But Figure 3 shows that inherited trust
has also a non negligible impact on GDP per capita in developed countries. European countries
such as France or the United-Kingdom would increase their GDP by 5 percent if the level of
inherited trust was the same as in Sweden.
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of inherited trust on GDP per capita from another perspective.
This Figure displays the reduction in the GDP per capita gap relative to Sweden that would
occur if the level of inherited trust was the same as in Sweden during the period 2000-2003
(for countries whose GDP per capita is lower than Sweden). This Figure merely shows that
differences in inherited trust explain a relatively small part of the differences in GDP per capita
between developing countries and developed countries. Although Figure 3 shows that the income
per capita would have been much higher in developing countries if people had inherited the same
level of trust as the Swedes, Figure 4 indicates that the increase in income would have been too
small to reduce the major part of the gap in income between developing and developed countries.
In other words, there is a very important lack of inherited trust in developing countries which
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Figure 4: Reduction (in percentage) in the gap in GDP per capita with respect to Sweden if
the level of inherited trust of people of working age were the same as in Sweden in the period
2000-2003.
exerts a significant negative impact on income per capita. However, this lack of inherited trust
explains only about 5 percent of the income per capita difference between China and India on
one hand and Sweden on the other hand in the period 2000-2003. For Africa, this figure amounts
to about 10 percent.
The role of country fixed effects
Our approach adds new insights on the impact of social capital on economic development
to the extent that previous studies found correlations between trust and economic performance,
but without controlling for national time invariant specificities (La Porta et al., 1997, Knack and
Keefer, 1997, Tabellini, 2005). In that regard, it is instructive to reassess the link between trust
and GDP per capita in our framework but without controlling for country fixed effects. The
comparison of Figures 3 and 5 shows12 that the impact of inherited trust on GDP per capita
would have been overestimated by a factor of three if the country fixed effects were not controlled
for. It is evident that the inclusion of country fixed effect is of first importance. Accordingly, it
is necessary to account for changes in social capital and use time-varying instruments for trust
in order to isolate the specific contribution of social capital in growth.
12 In Figure 5 the change in GDP per capita is equal to −α1δ1SˆUSct where the estimated value of the coefficients
α1 and δ1 are taken from Table 6-Col 2, Panels A and B.
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It is also worth discussing how our results are related to the literature providing alternative
candidates for explaining the role of specific national features. The emphasis has been put mainly
on two candidates: institutions and geography. Institutions, in particular property rights and
rule of law, have been found to limit rent-seeking or rent-extracting behavior and provide the
incentives for individuals and firms to invest in productive activities. Hall and Jones (1999)
found an overwhelming effect of social infrastructures on the cross-country heterogeneity in
output per worker. They defined social infrastructures as a composite index of government anti-
diversion policies and the Sachs and Warner (1995) indicator on the openness of a country to
other countries. Hall and Jones did control for potential reverse causality by using instrumental
variables such as distance to equator or primary languages. Acemoglu et al. (2001) provided
additional evidence on the role of the quality of institutions on the economic development of
previous colonies by instrumenting extractive institutions with the mortality rate of settlers.
Conversely, Sachs (2003) claimed that geography could have a much more direct effect on income
through diseases such as malaria, rather than just an indirect effect through institutions.
All these studies provide a careful econometric treatment of potential reverse causality chan-
nels. Yet they are based on cross-country comparison and cannot control for country fixed effects
since they use time invariant instruments for institutions and geography. They thus face a prob-
lem of potential co-determination of their explanatory variable with other more fundamental
invariant national features. This raises concern about the fundamental causality channel be-
tween an identified institutional or geographical factor and growth. Rodrick (1999) stressed this
major concern in his study on the consequences of fractionalization and inequality on growth.
Using time invariant indicators at the national level, Rodrick was able to include dummies only
at the regional level rather than at the country level. He concluded with disappointment that
these regional dummies remain highly significant after the introduction of proxies for fraction-
alization, inequality and property rights enforcement. This suggests that these explanatory
variables are likely to be no longer statistically significant if country fixed effects were to be
included.
Our strategy helps to solve this problem by accounting for changes in social capital. It is
important to stress that we do take into account all the institutions and geographical factors
provided in the previous literature. Since the institutions mentioned above are time invariant,
they are captured by our country fixed effects. But our country dummies also capture any insti-
tutional factors that are imperfectly measured by the existing indicators or any other potential
omitted invariant national features. We are thus able to disentangle the specific causal chan-
nel from social attitudes relative not only to institutions and geography but also to any other
potential invariant national factors.
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Figure 5: Predicted variations in GDP per capita in period 2000-2003 if the level of inherited
trust of people in working age were the same as in Sweden, without controlling for country fixed
effects.
4.3.2 Overidentification tests
We investigate the validity of our macroestimates by using overidentification tests. Our in-
strumental strategy is relevant only as long as inherited social attitudes of second-generation
Americans are truly exogenous as regards economic development in the home countries. We
thus look for additional instruments to be able to perform overidentification tests. For that
purpose, we use social attitudes of Americans whose wave of immigration is older than the
second-generation. We select all Americans in the GSS database who answered that either their
parents or grand-parents were born in the Unites States. This allows us to focus on the third
wave, the fourth wave or older waves of immigrations of Americans. We can presume that the
effect of potential omitted variables, which could co-determine both social attitudes of Ameri-
cans whose wave of immigration is higher than the second-generation and the contemporaneous
economic development in the home countries, would be more insignificant than those at work
with social attitudes of second-generation Americans. Accordingly, we check whether the in-
herited social attitudes of second-generation Americans are exogenous with respect to current
macroeconomic performance in their home country under the assumption that the inherited
social attitudes of Americans whose wave of immigration is older than the second-generation are
truly exogenous.
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To select older waves of immigration, we use the question on the birthplace of parents. We
focus on respondents who say that they were born in the United States and that both of their
parents were also born in this country. This sample thus gathers Americans belonging to a wave
of immigration older or equal to the third wave. We then proceed as in the previous section
by distinguishing two cohorts among this sample: people who belonged to the working age
population (18-65 years old) in 1949-1952 or in 2000-2003. To estimate the marginal effect of
the country of origin on social attitudes of these cohorts of Americans, we run exactly the same
probit estimate on the probability that they answer yes to the question: “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with
people?”. In addition to country-of-ancestry dummies, we still control for age (age squared),
sex, education, income, employment status and religious affiliation. Swedish ancestors are still
considered as the reference group.
The results of the overidentification tests are reported in Table 7. Column (1) gives the first
stage estimates of the effect of social attitudes of the two cohorts of Americans, whose wave of
immigration is older than the second generation, on social attitudes of the people belonging to
the same cohorts in the home countries. Column (2) reports the second stage estimates of social
attitudes on economic development. We report the estimates with country fixed effects and the
lagged values of GDP per capita to dampen as much as possible any issue of omitted variables.
But the overidentification tests lead to the same conclusion without these additional controls.
Column (1) shows that inherited social attitudes of Americans whose wave of immigration is
older than the second-generation are significantly positively correlated with social attitudes in
the home countries. The correlation is statistically significant at the one percent level and the
size is of the same order as the previous one with inherited social attitudes of Americans of
second generation. Column (2) shows that this new instrument has an economically sizeable
and statistically significant effect on the GDP per capita in the home countries. Moreover, the
coefficient associated with social attitudes in the second stage regression is of the same order of
magnitude as the one found in Table 6 - Column 3.
Finally, we perform different tests of overidentification. We first perform a χ2 overidentifica-
tion test assessing whether the 3SLS coefficient for GDP per capita estimated with the inherited
social attitudes of Americans whose wave of immigration is higher than the second-generation
is significantly different than the one estimated using these inherited social attitudes together
with those of second-generation Americans. Table 7 - Column (3) reports the corresponding
two stage coefficient associated with the impact of trust on income per capita. The effect is
statistically significant at the one percent level. The bottom of Column (3) reports the p-value
for the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients associated with the economic effect of trust
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depending on the two different specifications in the first stage. The null-hypothesis of equality
of the second stage coefficients in the two different specifications cannot be rejected at the 10
percent level. Furthermore Table 7 - Column (4) reports an easy-to-interpret test consisting in
directly adding our instrument for social attitudes of second-generation Americans in the second
stage regression. The first stage estimate has been obtained by using trust of Americans whose
ancestors came from later waves of immigration as the only instrument. As shown in Table
7 - Column (4), inherited trust of second-generation Americans has a statistically insignificant
direct effect on GDP per capita and this direct effect would come with a negative sign when we
already control for another instrumented value of social attitudes in the home countries.
Table 7: Overidentification restriction - Aggregate estimates
(1) First stage (2) Second stage (3) Second stage (4) Second stage
Trust in
home countries
GDP per capita
in home
countries
GDP per capita
in home
countries
GDP per capita
in home
countries
Trust in
home countries
42291.37***
(9437.352)
41989.22***
(8872.57)
44350.34***
(8299.228)
Trust of second
generation
Americans
- 5894.65
( 4015.02)
Trust of Americans
from older waves
of immigration
.492***
(.124)
Adj-R2 .977 .898 .919 .920
Overident. test
p-value (χ2test) [0.891]
Observations 43 43 43 43
3SLS estimates. Period: 1949-1952 and 200-2003. Col. (2) and (4) use social attitudes in the home
countries instrumented by trust of Americans whose wave of immigration is older than the second generation.
Col. (3) use social attitudes in the home countries instrumented by trust of second-generation Americans
and trust of Americans from older waves of immigration.
All specifications control for country fixed effects and lagged values of GDP per capita
4.3.3 Decomposition of the impact of social attitudes
The previous section has shown that differences in inherited trust have a strong direct impact on
differences in GDP per capita. But inherited trust may influence economic performance through
different channels such as investment, employment and the overall efficiency of labor and capital.
In order to identify these channels, let us assume that output is produced with a Cobb Douglas
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technology:
Yct = ActKαct(hctLct)1−α
where Yct,Act, Kct, Lct, and hct refer to output, total factor productivity, capital, employment
and average level of education in the population in country c at time t. This equation yields
a simple relation between the cross-country log-differences in output per capita and the cross-
country differences in the employment population ratio and in the technological parameter,
which reads:
∆yct = ∆act + α∆kct + (1− α)(∆hct +∆ℓct) (7)
where ∆yct = log(Yct/Nct)− log(Yc¯t/Nc¯t) stands for the difference between the log of GDP per
capita in country c in period t and the log of GDP per capita in the reference country denoted
by c¯ (which is still Sweden) during the same period. The similar definition holds for ∆kct =
log(Kct/Nct)− log(Kc¯t/Nc¯t), ∆ℓct = log(Lct/Nct)− log(Lc¯t/Nc¯t) and ∆hct = log(hct)− log(hc¯t) .
Differences in total factor productivity read ∆act = log(Act)−log(Ac¯t). Total factor productivity
is calculated as the traditional Solow residual of equation (8).
As stressed in the previous section, causality could run in both directions between social
attitudes and the factors of production. Education may strengthen trust for instance if the
roots of distrust lie in ignorance (Banfield, 1958) or if educational policies put the emphasis
on teaching the students how to behave cooperatively. Similarly, higher employment rates are
associated with more efficient labor markets and could breed trust.
To tackle this issue, we follow the previous strategy by running 3SLS estimates on the
system of equations (5) and (6), the dependent variables of equation (5), are respectively yˆct,
∆kct,∆hct,∆ℓct or ∆act. Importantly, we include country fixed effects in these regressions which
could pick up the influence of national institutions and infrastructures. Such country fixed-effects
might be important since Hall and Jones (1999) showed that social infrastructures account for the
main part of total factor productivity. Similarly, the quality of property rights could significantly
affect the incentives to accumulate physical and human capital.
Table 8 reports the 3SLS estimated effect of social attitudes on ∆yct, ∆kct,∆hct,∆ℓct and
∆act over the two periods 1949-1952 and 2000-2003. The coefficients of the first stage regression
of national trust on inherited trust are statistically significant and of the same order of magnitude
as the previous ones. The first striking result is that inherited trust has a positive impact on
every component of the changes in GDP per capita: it steadily increases both the capital stock,
the employment rate, the average years of education and the level of total factor productivity.
For each input, the coefficient associated with trust is significant at the 1 percent level even
when one controls for the lagged gap in income per capita and country dummies (except for
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employment, where trust becomes significant at the 5 percent level). Second, Table 8 shows that
the main channels through which social attitudes affect production is total factor productivity
and physical and human capital accumulation. Actually, 34 percent (8.084 over 23.681) of the
impact of inherited trust on GDP per capita is due to differences in total factor productivity.
The impact of inherited trust on differences in education, measured by the number of years
of schooling, explains about 34 percent (11.710 time the coefficient 1 − α, equal to 0.7 = 8.19
over 23.681), and the impact of trust through physical capital accounts for 27 percent of the
differences in income per capita. The influence of employment is by comparison much more
marginal since it explains the residual 5 percent of differences in income per capita.
This accounting exercise provides new insight on the economic effect of social attitudes. By
comparison with Hall and Jones (1999), we show that social attitudes which are not embedded
in invariant institutions, such as their social infrastructures indicator, also have a major effect
on total factor productivity. Next, we found a new significant impact of social attitudes on total
factor productivity and capital accumulation when the causality link is properly accounted for.
This result is at odds with the findings of Keefer and Knack (1997) based on the correlation
between national indicators of trust and the factors of production. In particular, the latter
authors found that the coefficient associated with trust was in general not statistically significant
in explaining production inputs when they included the proxies for social infrastructures of Hall
and Jones (1999). We show that controlling for reverse causality and changes in social attitudes is
key for understanding the incentives to innovate and to accumulate physical and human capital.
Table 8: Decomposition of the impact of social attitudes on production inputs: 3SLS estimates.
Trust in home countries is instrumented by trust of second-generation Americans, lagged GDP
gap and country dummies.
3SLS Estimates GDP(1)
Capital
(2)
Employment
(3)
Education
(4)
TFP
(5)
Trust in home countries 23.681
***
( 3.612)
21.106***
(4.427)
1.671**
(.719)
11.710***
(1.709)
8.084***
(2.324)
Lagged gap in GDP -1.776
***
(.433)
-1.719***
(.5539)
-.170**
(.086)
-1.168***
( .204)
-.438***
( .291)
Country dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Adj-R2 .836 .858 .834 .856 .645
Observations 45 42 45 45 42
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4.4 The role of social interactions
It is likely that the strong macroeconomic impact of inherited trust on economic development
relies on social interactions: trust fosters cooperation only to the extent that trusting individuals
interact with people who share the same high level of trust and are prone to cooperate with
each other. This section provides tentative evidence of such social interactions in trust which
could explain its sizeable macroeconomic effect. We look at the relationship between individual
economic performance and social interactions between individual trust and average national
trust. We run this analysis for different indicators of individual economic performance available
in the WVS database. The analysis is based on the working age population for the waves 1980,
1990 and 2000. For cross-country empirical analysis, we run regressions of the following type:
yict = a0 + a1sict + a2sictSct + a3xit + fct + eict (8)
where yict stands for an indicator of economic performance of individual i in country c at date
t. The variable sict measures individual level of trust, Sct measures the country average level of
trust and the product sictSct captures social interactions in trust. The variable xit denotes a
vector of individual characteristics such as gender, age, level of education, marital status and
religious affiliation. Lastly we control for other time varying national effects fct and eict is an
error term.
In lines with the previous macro-estimates, we first look at the relationship between indi-
vidual income and social interactions in trust. The measure of income is given by the following
question in the WVS database: “Here is a scale of incomes and we would like to know in what
group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.
Just give the letter of the group you fall into, after taxes and other deductions”. The answer
is ordered in ten income categories corresponding to each decile.13 In Table 9 - Columns (1)
and (2), we present our regressions of income deciles on our indicators of individual trust and
social interactions. We also control for individual characteristics including age, a quadratic for
age, the number of years of education, marital status and religious affiliation. And we include
time-varying national specific features. We run ordered probit estimates since our dependent
variable, the income decile, is categorical.
Table 9 - Column (1) first suggests that the fact of trusting others is associated with a
significant rise in the income ladder. The effect is statistically significant at the one percent
level. But Table 9 - Column (2) indicates that this correlation pattern is driven by social
interactions. When the interaction term between individual trust and national average trust
13Unfortunatly, the WVS database reports the income by categories instead of the levels of wages and incomes.
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is controlled for, the coefficient on individual trust is still positively correlated with individual
income but the effect is no longer statistically significant. By contrast, the interaction term is
statistically significant at the one percent level and the size of the coefficient is nearly three
times higher than the one associated with individual trust in Column (1).
Table 9: Social interactions in mutual trust and individual income: Ordered Probit estimates.
Income deciles
(1) (2)
Individual
trust
.131***
(.015)
.0003
(.057)
Individual trust ×
National Trust
.350***
(.012)
Adj-R2 .056 .059
Observations 74893 74893
Controls: gender, age, age squared, education,religion,marital status,
time varying country effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source WVS, 1980, 1990, 2000: ∗∗∗: 1%,∗∗: 5%,∗: 10%
Consistently with the macro-estimates, we then disentangle the different channels through
which social interactions could favor individual economic performance. The first natural channel
for explaining individual income could go through the employment status of the respondent. We
first investigate the link between trust and labor market participation. According to Banfield’s
(1958) analysis of amoral familism, we should expect that individuals who have a low level of
trust and who are living in a low-trust environment would prefer to restrict their activities to
the family and to home production. We measure labor participation by a dummy equal to 1
if the respondent reports employed, self-employed or unemployed. The dummy is equal to 0
otherwise. We also investigate the link between trust and the fact of being employed rather
than unemployed. We measure this outcome by a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the
respondent reports employed full-time, and 0 if the respondent reports unemployed.
In Table 10 - Columns (1)-(4), we present the estimates for the employment status on
individual trust and social interactions. We control for the same set of variables as before,
including time-varying country effects and individual characteristics. Columns (1)-(2) report
the probit estimates for labor market participation. Column (1) shows that the coefficient on
individual trust is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level as long as we do
not control for the social interaction term. But as reported in Column (2), the effect of trust
depends heavily on interactions with high trusting individuals. When we include the interaction
term, the coefficient on individual trust becomes negative and is no longer statistically significant.
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By contrast, the social interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the one percent
level. The magnitude of the coefficient is also high, since the social interaction term is more
than four times as high as the one associated with individual trust in Column (1). Table 10 -
Columns (3) and (4) report the probit estimates on the probability of being employed rather than
unemployed. The same positive correlation pattern holds between the fact of being employed
and the extent of social interactions. When included, the interaction term drives the whole
correlation and the marginal effect is economically very sizeable.
The second channel for explaining individual income could transit through the propensity
to save. To get a measure of capital accumulation at the individual level, we use the following
question from theWVS database: “During the past year, did your family : i) save money, ii) just
get by, iii) spent some savings and borrowed money, iv) spent savings and borrowed money”. We
recode the answers such that a higher score indicates a higher propensity to save. The answer
to this question is likely to capture individual shocks on the labor market as well as higher
preference for thriftiness. We thus control whether the individual is employed, self-employed,
unemployed or inactive, in addition to the other previous individual controls.
Table 11 - Columns (1)-(2) report the ordered probit estimate of the propensity to save.
Column (1) shows that the coefficient associated with individual trust is positively correlated
with higher saving behaviors. But column (2) indicates that this correlation mainly goes through
social interactions. The interaction term is the only coefficient which is statistically significant
and is nearly three times as high as the coefficient associated with individual trust in Column
(1).
The last channel consistent with the macro estimate is the relation between trust and the
Solow residual. For that purpose, we look at attitudes which are favorable to competition and
innovation. We consider a question representative of this kind of attitudes phrased as follows:
“Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas. Or competition
is harmful, it brings out the worst in people”. The answer is scaled between 1 and 10, a higher
score indicating that the respondent considers that competition is harmful instead of stimulating
people and developing new ideas. We recode the answers the other way around such that a higher
score increases the probability that the respondent is favorable to competition and innovation.
Table 11 - Columns (3) and (4) report the link between individual trust, social interactions
and the probability that the respondent considers competition as a way of encouraging inno-
vation. The interaction term is the only one to be significant at the one percent level and its
coefficient is almost an order of magnitude higher than the one associated with individual trust.
These micro-estimates add credit to the strong impact of trust on economic development found
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at the aggregate level, suggesting that this key impact is linked to strong social interaction
effects.
Table 10: Channels for social interaction effects on individual income: Employment status.
Probit estimates
Labor market participation Employed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual
trust
.097***
(.023)
-.061
(.060)
.179***
(.021)
.008
(.067)
Individual trust ×
National Trust
.433***
(.187)
.466***
(.175)
Adj-R2 .418 .419 .155 .1562
Observations 69709 69709 41991 41991
Controls: gender, age, age squared, education, marital status, religion,
time-varying country effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Source WVS, 1980, 1990 and 2000: ∗∗∗: 1%,∗∗: 5%,∗: 10%
Table 11: Channels for social interaction effects on individual income: Savings and Innovation.
Ordered probit estimates
Savings Innovations
Family saved
money last year
Competition is good:
it brings new ideas
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual
trust
.058***
(.022)
-.015
(.057)
.051***
(.020)
-.095
(.053)
Individual trust ×
National Trust
.188**
(.082)
.394***
(.132)
Adj-R2 .035 .038 .048 048
Observations 27206 27206 30112 30112
Controls: gender, age, age squared, education, marital status, religion,
time-varying country effects. Employment status included in (5) and (6).
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Source WVS, 1980, 1990 and 2000: ∗∗∗: 1%,∗∗: 5%,∗: 10%
5 Conclusion
This paper has provided a new empirical strategy to uncover the causal effect of social attitudes
on economic development. By using the level of trust that second-generation Americans inherited
from their country of origin as an instrument for trust in the corresponding home countries, we
have been able to identify an exogenous variation in trust across countries and over time. The
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time-varying dimension of social attitudes enabled us to isolate the specific contribution of trust
to economic development relative to other traditional candidates - institutions and geography -
captured by the country fixed effects. By using this methodology on a panel of 30 countries over
the period 1949-2003, we found that trust has a significant causal impact on macroeconomic
outcomes. Most of the effects go through total factor productivity and the accumulation of
physical and human capital. We also provided evidence that the magnitude of the effect of trust
on economic development is linked to strong social interactions effects.
A remaining question is the underlying reasons for changes in social attitudes. This paper has
used exogenous changes in inherited trust linked to the cohorts to which individuals belonged.
We have shown that trust inherited by second-generation Americans from their country of origin
differs significantly depending on their cohorts, and thus on the time of immigration of their
parents in the United States. One main reason for such changes in trust is likely to be national
crisis such as the two World Wars which have affected the different countries and the different
generations differently. But this research agenda might also be promising for studying the effect
of changes in institutions on the evolution of cooperative attitudes. This is a prerequisite for
identifying institutions and public policies which are conducive to cooperative attitudes and
could thus favor economic development.
35
References
[1] Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, 2001, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Devel-
opment: An Empirical Investigation, American Economic Review, volume 91, pp. 1369-1401.
[2] Acemoglu, D., Johnson S. and Robinson, J., 2005, Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of
Long-run Growth, Handbook of Economic Growth, eds North Holland.
[3] Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E., 2002, Who trust others? , Journal of Public Economics, vol.
85(2), p.207-304..
[4] Alesina, A. and Fuchs-Schuendeln, N., 2005, Good bye Lenin (or not?): The effect of Com-
munism on people’s preferences , Harvard Working Paper.
[5] Algan, Y. and Cahuc, P., 2005, The Roots of Low European Employment: Family Culture?,
forthcoming in Pissarides, C. and Frenkel, J. (eds.) NBER Macroeconomics Annual, MIT
Press, 2005
[6] Algan, Y. and Cahuc, P., 2006, Civic culture and the Design of Labor Market Institutions,
IZA Discussion Paper 1928.
[7] Antecol, H., 2000, An Examination of Cross-Country Differences in the Gender Gap in Labor
Force Participation Rates, Labour Economics 7, pp. 409-426.
[8] Arrow, K., 1972, Gifts and Exchanges, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol 1, pp. 343-362.
[9] Banfield, E. 1958, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, New York, Free Press.
[10] Benabou, R. and J. Tirole, 2006, Beliefs in a Just World and Redistributive Politics, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 121(2), pp. 699-746.
[11] Bisin, A and T. Verdier, 2001, The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Evolution
of Preferences, Journal of Economic Theory, 97(2), pp. 298-319.
[12] Bisin, A. , G. Topa and T. Verdier, 2004, Cooperation as a transmitted cultural trait,
Rationality and Society, 16, pp. 477-507.
[13] Blau, F., 1992, The fertility of immigrant women: evidence from high fertility source coun-
tries. In: Borjas, G.J., Freeman, R. Eds. , Immigration and the workforce: economic conse-
quences for the United States and source areas. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
pp. 93—133.
36
[14] Carroll, C.D., Rhee, C. and Rhee, B., 1999, Does Cultural Origin Affect Saving Behavior?
Evidence from Immigrants. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 48(1), pp. 33—50.
[15] Coleman, J., 1988, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, American Journal of
Sociology, vol 94, pp. 95-120.
[16] Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2002, The Regulation Of
Entry, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pp. 1-37.
[17] Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D. and Sunde, U., 2006, The Intergenerational Transmis-
sion of Risks and Trust Attitudes, mimeo, IZA.
[18] Durlauf, S. and Fafchamps, M., 2005, Social Capital, in Handbook of Economic Growth,
vol 1, chapter 26, pp. 1639-1699, Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S, eds, Elsevier Amsterdam: North
Holland.
[19] Easterly, W. and Levine, R., (2001), It‘s Not Factor Accumulation: Stylized Facts and
Growth Models, World Bank Economic Review, vol. 15(2), pp. 177-219.
[20] Fafchamps, M. ,1996, The enforcement of commerical contracts in Ghana, World Develop-
ment, 24, 3, pp. 427-448.
[21] Fernandez, R., 2006, Culture and Economics, Forthcoming in Palgrave Dictionary of Eco-
nomics.
[22] Fernandez, R. and Fogli, A., 2005, Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs, Work,
and Fertility, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department Staff Report 361.
[23] Fernández, R., Fogli, A. and Olivetti, C., 2004, Mothers and Sons: Preference Formation
and Female Labor Force Dynamics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4), 1249-1299.
[24] Fukuyama, F., 1995, Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity, Free Press.
[25] Gambetta, T., 1988, Trust, Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, Oxford: Black-
well.
[26] Giuliano, P., 2004, On the Determinants of Living Arrangements in Western Europe: Does
Cultural Origin Matter?, mimeo, U.C. Berkeley.
[27] Guinnane, T., Moehling, C. and Grada, C., 2002, The Fertility of the Irish in America in
1910, mimeo, Yale University.
37
[28] Gurr, T., 1990, Polity II: Political structures and Regime Change, 1800-1986, Ann Arbor,
MI: Inter-Universiy Consortium for Political and Social Research.
[29] Greif, A., 1993, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The
Maghribi Traders’ Coalition.” American Economic Review, vol. 83, pp. 525-48.
[30] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L., 2004, The Role of Social Capital in Financial
Development, American Economic Review vol 94, pp. 526-556.
[31] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L., 2006, Does Culture Affect Economic Outcome?,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol 20, pp. 23-48.
[32] Francois P. and J. Zabojnik, 2005, Trust, Social Capital and Economic Development, Jour-
nal of the European Economic Associat ion, 3(1), pp. 51-94.
[33] Hauk, E. and M. Saez-Martí, 2002, On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption", Journal
of Economic Theory 107(2), pp. 311-335
[34] Knack, S. and Keefer, P., 1997, Does social capital have a economic payoff, A cross-country
comparison, vol.112, pp. 1251-1288.
[35] Inglehart, R. and Welzel, L., 2005, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. New
York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[36] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silvanes, F., Shleifer, R., Vishny, 1997, Trust in Large Organiza-
tions, American Economic Review, vol 87, pp. 333-38.
[37] Maddison, A., 2001, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, OECD 2001.
[38] Morrisson, C. and Murtin, F., 2005, The World Distribution of Human Capital, Life Ex-
pectancy and Income: a Multi-dimensional Approach, mimeo CREST.
[39] Nisbett, R., 1996, Culture of honor : the psychology of violence in the South, Westview
Press.
[40] Platteau, J.P., 2000, Institutions, social norms, and economic development, Fundamentals
of Development Economics, vol. 1. Reading, U.K.: Harwood Academic.
[41] Putnam, R., 1993, Making Democracy Work, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
[42] Putnam, R., 2000, Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New
York: Simon and Schuster.
38
[43] Reimers, C.W., 1985, Cultural differences in labor force participation among married
women, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 75, pp. 251—255.
[44] Rice, T., and Feldman, J., 1997, Civic Culture and Democracy from Europe to America,
The Journal of Politics, pp. 1143-72.
[45] Robinson, R. and Jackson, E., 20001, Is Trust in Others Declining in America? An Age-
Period-Cohort Analysis, Social Science Research, 30, pp. 117-45.
[46] Rodrik, A., 1999, Where all did all the growth go? External shocks, social conflict, and
growth collapses, Journal of economic growth, p. 385-412.
[47] Rodrick, A., A. Subramanian, Trebbi, F. , 2004, Institutions Rule: The Primacy of In-
stitutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, Journal of Economic
Growth, vol. 9, no.2.
[48] Sachs, J. and Warner, A., 1995, Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Issue 1.
[49] Sachs, J. D., 2003, Institutions Don’t Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita
Income, NBER Working Papers 9490.
[50] Tabellini, G., 2005, Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of
Europe, IGIER working paper n◦292.
[51] Tabellini, G., 2007, The Scope of Cooperation: norms and incentives, mimeo, IGIER.
[52] Tocqueville, A., 1835, Democracy in America, Penguin Classics edition 2003.
[53] Zak, P.J. and Knack, S. 2001, Trust and Growth, The Economic Journal, vol 111, 295-331.
39
A Description of the estimation procedure
The aim of this appendix is to provide a detailed description of our estimation procedure.
We estimate the equation (variables are defined in the main text)
Yct = α0 + α1Sct + α2Xct + Fc + Ft + εct (A1)
where, Sct is the average of social attitudes of people of working age in country c in period t conditional
on their individual characteristics.
More precisely, Sct is obtained by estimating the following equation
sict = β0t + βctIict + β2txit + εict, (A2)
where sict denotes the social attitude of individual i who lives in country c in period t, xit stands for
a set of individual characteristics including the number of years of education, income, age, employment
status and religious affiliation. Iict is an indicator variable, equal to one if the individual i belongs to
country c and to zero otherwise. εict is an error term. The estimation of this equation allows us to
obtain the differences between the average social attitudes of people in country c in period t conditional
on their individual characteristics, and the average social attitudes of people in a reference country in
period t conditional on their individual characteristics. The reference country is Sweden throughout the
paper. Let us denote by ∆Sct the difference between the conditional average of attitudes in country c in
period t and the conditional average of attitudes in the reference country in the same period; one gets,
by definition:
∆Sct = βˆct,
where βˆct denotes the estimated value of the parameter βct. This definition of social attitudes, which are
defined with respect to the attitudes of people who live in Sweden, leads us to estimate the equation (A1)
written as
∆Yct = α1∆Sct + α2∆Xct + Fc +∆εct (A3)
where the operator ∆ stands for the differences between the value of the variable and its value in Sweden.
In equation (A3), ∆Sct is likely not independent of the residual ∆εct, which represents the specific
shock on the indicator of economic performance (GDP, employment rate...) of country c in period t.
Therefore, we look for an instrument for the variable ∆Sct. Assuming that social attitudes are
transmitted across generations according to the model
Sct = γ0 + γ1Sct−1 + γ2Xct +Φc +Φt + νct, (A4)
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or, when written in differences with respect to Sweden,
∆Sct = γ1∆Sct−1 + γ2∆Xct +Φc +∆νct, (A5)
a natural instrument for ∆Sct is ∆Sct−1, which measures the conditional average of social attitudes of the
previous generation, i.e. of people who were of working age in the same country one generation before
those who work in period t. To be able to uncover the social attitudes of the previous generation, we
have to define periods which are separated by sufficiently large gaps. Namely, we consider two periods:
1949-1952 and 2000-2003. We consider that the working age population is made up of people aged from
eighteen to sixty five years old. This leads us to define two generations: people who were born between
1935 and 1985 and were of working age between 2000-2003 , and people who were born during the period
1884-1934 and were of working age in 1949-1952.
The problem of equation (A4) is that we do not observe Sct−1 and then ∆Sct−1. Therefore, we use
the correlation between the social attitudes of people born in the US but whose parents, born in country
c, immigrated to the US, and the social attitudes of people currently living in the country c.
We first measure the social attitudes of people currently living in the US and who originate from
country c in the same way as we measure the social attitudes of people currently living in country
c. We estimate the equation (A2) for people currently living in the US, where Iict now stands for an
indicator variable equal to one if the parents of individual i immigrated from country c. The estimation
of this equation allows us to get the differences between the average social attitudes (conditional on
individual characteristics xit) of Americans whose parents immigrated from country c, and the conditional
average social attitudes of Americans whose parents immigrated from Sweden. We denote by ∆S˜ct these
differences.
Then, we assume that immigrants transmit their social attitudes, inherited from their country of
origin, to their children. In other words, we assume that S˜ct, the conditional average of social attitudes
of people of working age in period t, who live and were born in the US and whose parents immigrated
from country c, is determined by the model
S˜ct = γ˜0 + γ˜1Sct−1 + Φt + ν˜ct, (A6)
which reads, when written in differences with respect to Sweden,
∆S˜ct = γ˜1∆Sct−1 +∆ν˜ct. (A7)
Assuming that γ˜1 = 0, the elimination of ∆Sct−1 from equations (A5) and (A7) leads to a relation
between ∆Sct and ∆S˜ct which can be written as
∆Sct = λ1∆S˜ct + γ2∆Xct +Φc +∆µct, (A8)
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where λ1 = γ1/γ˜1, and ∆µct = ∆νct − (γ1/γ˜1)∆ν˜ct.
We then estimate the system of equations (A3) and (A8). ∆S˜ct is an instrument for ∆Sct if E(∆S˜ct ·
∆εct) = 0, i.e. if the social attitudes inherited by Americans of working age in period t from their country
of origin are independent of the shocks on macroeconomic performance (Yct) in their country of origin
in period t. This assumption is likely to be fulfilled to the extent that the correlation between ∆S˜ct and
∆Sct only comes from the past common attitudes of the people of the previous generations who were
born in country c.
The system of equations (A3) and (A8) can be estimated directly for the period 2000-2003, since we
observe Sct and S˜ct, the conditional average of social attitudes of people of working age (born between
1935 and 1985) in the US and in the countries of the sample for this period. However, we do not observe
the social attitudes of people of working age in the period 1949-1952 since there are no data on social
attitudes available in this period.
Let us denote by t = 1 the period 1949-1952 and t = 2, the period 2000-2003.
As long as there is a persistence of social attitudes within a given cohort, it is also possible to uncover
social attitudes of people of working age in the period t = 1. Denoting by S0c2 the conditional average
(estimated with equation (A2)) of social attitudes of “old” people (who are no longer of working age in
period 2, i.e. who were born before 1935 for the period 2000-2003) who live in country c in period t = 2,
we assume that
S0c2 = pi0 + Sc1 + ξc2,
where ξc2 is an error term.
Similarly, for people who were born in the US, we assume that
S˜0c2 = p˜i0 + S˜c1 + ξ˜c2.
Using the values of Sc1 and S˜c1 defined in these two last equations and equations (A3) and (A8) we
can write the set of equations that we estimate for periods t = 1, 2 :
∆Yc2 = α1∆Sc2 + α2∆Xc2 + Fc +∆εc2 (A9)
∆Sc2 = λ1∆S˜c2 + γ2∆Xc2 +Φc +∆µc2 (A10)
∆Yc1 = α1∆S0c2 + α2∆Xc1 + Fc +∆εc1 − α1∆ξc2 (A11)
∆S0c2 = λ1∆S˜0c2 + γ2∆Xc1 +Φc +∆µc1 +∆ξc2 − λ1∆ξ˜c2. (A12)
In period t = 1, ∆S˜0c2 is a relevant instrument for ∆S0c2 if E(∆S˜0c2 · (∆εc1 − α1∆ξc2)) = 0. This
assumption is likely to be fulfilled to the extent that S˜0c2, the conditional average of social attitudes of
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“old” people who live in the US in 2000-2003 and were born in the US before 1935, is not correlated with
εc1, the shocks on GDP in their country of origin, and with ξc2, the shocks on social attitudes of “old”
people in their country of origin in 2000-2003. As the system of equations makes clear, the residuals of the
different equations can be correlated. We thus estimate the coefficient of interest α1 by a three stage least
square procedure in order to get a variance of the estimators robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity.
43
B Data Appendix
Table 12: Summary statistics for second generation Americans: GSS database 1977-2002
country of origin Obs Trust Men Age Education Emp. Unemp. Inactive
Africa 107 .192 .514 38.68 12.75 .679 .066 .255
Austria 83 .531 .506 62.18 11.54 .315 .026 .657
Arabic 36 .452 .638 34.33 13.12 .457 .028 .514
Canada 140 .487 .584 55.06 11.72 .450 .05 .50
China 115 .437 .504 37.08 14.23 .707 .056 .235
Czech Republic 94 .508 .425 65.14 11.11 .228 .028 .742
Denmark 32 .785 .343 62.75 12.76 .391 .043 .565
Finland 50 .571 .360 63.34 10.63 .348 .023 .627
France 44 .521 .363 48.02 12.21 .555 .027 .416
Germany 331 .412 .407 59.76 12.09 .396 .012 .596
Greece 61 .333 .540 48.42 14.32 .615 .019 .365
Hungary 71 .454 .450 57.32 11.88 .430 0 .569
India 83 .400 .662 37.33 14.06 .817 .024 .158
Ireland 141 .551 .468 59.83 13.56 .437 .010 .552
Italy 471 .404 .447 59.15 11.88 .357 .031 .610
Mexico 360 .251 .461 37.31 11.68 .708 .061 .230
Netherlands 61 .538 .393 58.98 11.69 .440 .02 .54
Norway 68 .611 .426 67.63 12.30 .209 0 .790
Philippines 112 .266 .375 43.83 14.71 .772 .027 .20
Poland 273 .479 .483 60.56 11.74 .404 .01 .586
Portugal 31 .321 .419 47.70 11.43 .666 .041 .291
Puerto Rico 211 .183 .396 36.98 12.33 .554 .078 .366
Spain 98 .403 .459 41.70 13.7 .747 .034 .218
Spanish Latin America 196 .219 .403 37.30 13.56 .729 .052 .218
Sweden 66 .564 .378 65.71 12.51 .431 0 .568
United Kingdom 268 .522 .429 56.17 13.23 .452 .014 .533
Average 1808 .398 .438 51.38 12.34 .520 .032 .448
Std. Dev .489 .496 19.12 3.64 .499 .177 .447
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Table 13: Summary statistics by country of residency: WVS database
Country of residency Obs Trust Men Age
Algeria 1 014 .102 .508 32.77
Argentina 2 843 .184 .479 42.77
Austria 2 903 .327 .488 46.88
Canada 4 264 .457 .468 43.01
China 3 287 .550 .551 38.92
Colombia 2 914 .103 .500 35.40
Czech Republic 2 718 .268 .481 46.15
Denmark 2 634 .577 .510 43.42
Finland 2 426 .558 .492 41.95
France 3 275 .223 .488 43.17
Germany 5 870 .375 .456 45.54
Greece 1 050 .238 .424 35.94
Hungary 909 .224 .487 47.79
India 3 944 .367 .557 35.82
Ireland 2 350 .420 .463 45.34
Italy 4 359 .320 .491 43.06
Mexico 5 397 .250 .523 34.10
Morocco 994 .208 .493 29.18
Netherlands 2 433 .532 .460 34.10
Nigeria 3 511 .212 .547 30.69
Norway 4 337 .657 .520 42.74
Philippines 1 181 .086 .501 38.55
Poland 3 105 .230 .464 46.60
Portugal 2 023 .175 .446 44.00
Puerto Rico 1 630 .117 .354 44.60
Spain 8 386 .350 .489 43.43
Sweden 3 533 .639 .527 44.19
United Kingdom 2 640 .384 .474 45.09
Zimbabwe 851 .112 .517 32.78
Average 90704 .298 .485 41.46
Std. Dev .457 .499 16.44
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Table 14: Aggregate Summary statistics on macroeconomic performance: Periods 1949-52 and
2000-2003
Country Incomeper capita
Capital stock
per capita
Education
(years)
Employment rate
(over total population)
Africa 972.9031 3 085.658 5.337 .433
Austria 12 434.67 3 7350.270 8.703 .451
Arabic 2 126.112 4 555.007 1.967 .338
Canada 15 222.44 38 504.780 11.546 .425
China 2 199.453 7 372.988* 3.638 .444
Czech Republic 6 402.364 48 382.030* 8.807 .471
Denmark 15 043.470 42 802.59 0 9.318 .477
Finland 12 244.260 38 430.38 0 8.540 .465
France 13 599.530 38 745.150 9.572 .430
Germany 11 757.130 34 690.770 10.130 .434
Greece 7 483.725 18 964.08 0 7.857 .351
Hungary 5 118.611 24 145.320* 6.964 .422
India 1 318.472 2351.747 2.974 .365
Ireland 13 461.480 25 023.700 7.945 .424
Italy 11 453.910 34 209.290 7.316 .383
Mexico 4 805.527 9 640.011 4.685 .319
Netherlands 13 894.050 37 760.830 9.307 .429
Norway 15 700.930 46 400.650 10.043 .463
Philippines 1 812.672 3 916.997 4.852 .381
Poland 4 956.501 16 804.530* 7.645 .437
Portugal 8 047.235 24 600.430 4.695 .454
Puerto Rico 8 300.491 . .343
Spain 9 375.395 25 450.530 6.248 .398
Spanish Latin America 3 662.944 4 281.194 4.782 .326
Sweden 14 018.810 35 811.920 9.322 .483
United Kingdom 13 921.630 32 444.090 10.855 .455
*Data only for the period 2000-2003
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